Sword or Shield? Setting Limits on SLUSA’s Ever-Growing Reach by Glass, Cecilia A.
GLASS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014 3:31 PM 
 
Notes 
SWORD OR SHIELD? SETTING LIMITS ON 
SLUSA’S EVER-GROWING REACH 
CECILIA A. GLASS† 
ABSTRACT 
  Concerned by the overwhelming presence of vexatious federal 
securities-fraud class actions, Congress passed the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to increase the procedural burden 
plaintiffs would face in filing these nonmeritorious suits. Instead of 
being deterred, plaintiffs simply brought their suits in state court. 
Congress responded with the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (SLUSA), making federal court the exclusive venue for 
securities-fraud class actions. However, Congress expressly saved 
from SLUSA’s reach claims that were traditionally brought in state 
court under corporate law through the Delaware carve-out. 
  Though this exemption was meant to protect the historic dual 
federal-state securities-regulation regime, recent appellate court 
opinions have stretched SLUSA’s reach too far, leaving plaintiffs 
incapable of bringing many traditional state-law claims essential to 
the proper policing of corporate law regardless of the forum. This 
Note addresses the implications of such a broad reading of SLUSA 
and advocates a two-pronged approach that will simultaneously 
effectuate SLUSA’s purpose while still preserving these important 
state-law claims. By looking to the heart of a complaint, courts can 
best effectuate congressional intent both to limit problematic litigation 
practices and to preserve the important role federalism plays in the 
securities-law context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Persuaded that securities class actions were needlessly pillorying 
corporations, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995.1 The PSLRA was intended to 
minimize baseless securities-fraud claims and the vexatious litigation 
that accompanied them—legal entanglements many believed were 
harming the business world.2 Shortly after the PSLRA’s adoption, 
Congress was alerted to a troubling side effect of the new statute: 
instead of deterring plaintiffs’ lawyers from filing meritless securities 
class actions all together, the PSLRA was simply shifting many of 
these suits from federal court into state court.3 In response to this 
circumvention, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)4 to make federal court the exclusive 
forum for securities-fraud class actions so that litigants could not 
avoid the intended effects of the PSLRA.5 
Though Congress created SLUSA in response to a specific 
problem, courts have broadened its reach in problematic ways in the 
years since its enactment. Claims that never could have been brought 
in federal court are considered precluded by SLUSA,6 and clearly 
fraudulent behavior—a Ponzi scheme, for example—is shielded from 
litigation in any forum.7 Even more concerning is the lack of clarity 
among federal appellate courts regarding the scope of SLUSA’s 
reach. Further exacerbating this problem, a 2011 Seventh Circuit 
decision effectively condones defendants’ using the protections of 
SLUSA not as a shield from meritless litigation but as a sword against 
legitimate state-law claims.8 
This Note clarifies the reach of SLUSA, particularly as it relates 
to traditional breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims in state court. 
Congressional intent and federalism concerns inform most of the 
 
 1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 2. See infra Part I.B.  
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1–2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).  
 4. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. See infra Part I.C.2.  
 7. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 8. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 2011). For a discussion of Brown and the 
existing circuit split, see infra Part II. 
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analysis, as they do in both the courts’ opinions9 and in the academic 
literature discussing SLUSA.10 This Note concludes that the proper 
consideration of congressional intent and federalism is best facilitated 
by a two-pronged approach that focuses on the heart of the 
transaction in question. 
The Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief history of 
the PSLRA and SLUSA, focusing primarily on the historical 
securities-fraud litigation practices that motivated the statutes. It also 
briefly outlines the traditional scope of state regulation concerning 
the behavior of directors and how that regulation does and does not 
overlap with the field of federal securities regulation. Part II 
addresses a circuit split that has developed in interpreting one of 
SLUSA’s key provisions: the preclusion provision that prohibits 
certain state-law claims from proceeding as class actions in either 
state or federal court.11 It reviews recent decisions from the Third, 
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, and focuses in particular on a 2011 
decision out of the Seventh Circuit that goes one step further than 
any prior appellate decision interpreting the preclusion provision. 
The Seventh Circuit indicated that an entrenched type of state-law 
claim might be impossible to disentangle from claims that SLUSA 
precludes,12 thus bringing a new wave of actions under SLUSA’s 
reach.13 Part III focuses on how the Seventh Circuit’s decision violates 
principles of statutory interpretation and federalism. Finally, Part IV 
advances a two-part approach courts should take in analyzing 
whether a claim falls within SLUSA’s preemptive reach. First, courts 
should consider whether the claim is of the type Congress was 
attempting to preempt. This will help maximize the remedial benefits 
of the statute without unnecessarily precluding meritorious claims. 
Second, courts should look at the heart of a complaint to make this 
determination. By looking beyond the plain words of a complaint, 
courts can satisfy Congress’s preemptive goals without completely 
 
 9. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) 
(looking to congressional intent in interpreting the reach of SLUSA).  
 10. See, e.g., Jennifer O’Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act: If It Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities Fraud Claim, 
Is It a Securities Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 368 (2004) (emphasizing the role 
federalism should play in SLUSA’s interpretation).  
 11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(1)–(2) (2012).  
 12. Brown, 664 F.3d at 128–29. 
 13. See infra Part II.C. 
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eviscerating the important role that state law plays in the corporate 
context. 
I.  A BACKGROUND OF THE PSLRA, SLUSA, AND THE DELAWARE 
CARVE-OUT 
To fully understand the problems that arise from an overly broad 
application of SLUSA, it is important to understand its history. 
Unlike most statutes, SLUSA was created to solve a particular 
problem Congress itself had created. This makes its background and 
purpose particularly relevant for any analysis of its reach. 
Accordingly, this Part will briefly trace the history leading to its 
enactment, starting with an overview of federal securities-fraud 
litigation and the issues that led to the PSLRA. Next, this Part 
examines the key Supreme Court cases that interpret SLUSA before 
concluding with an overview of the Delaware carve-out and its 
purpose. 
A. Securities-Fraud Litigation Under Section 10(b) 
In 1933 and 1934 Congress passed substantial legislation 
federalizing the regulation of nationally traded securities in the wake 
of the Great Depression.14 Before the Depression, securities markets 
and their participants were only lightly regulated, if at all, by the 
states through statutes known as blue sky laws.15 The Securities Act of 
1933 (1933 Act)16 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 
Act)17 together provide specific protections for investors in nationally 
traded securities. In particular, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides 
that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of [Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules].”18 The SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b–5 in 1948 to further explain the reach of 
Section 10(b).19 In the years that followed the advent of Section 10(b) 
 
 14. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (“Federal regulation of 
transactions in securities emerged as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.”). 
 15. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
347, 348 (1991).  
 16. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).  
 17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).  
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  
 19. 13 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8183 (Dec. 15, 1948) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 
(2013)). 
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and Rule 10b–5, the Court played a large role in defining the scope of 
both.20 Despite the Supreme Court’s attempts to minimize the 
potential for plaintiffs to file vexatious suits,21 the number of suits—in 
particular meritless strike suits22—brought under this implied right of 
action continued to be alarming.23 
B. The Enactment of the PSLRA and the Subsequent Migration of 
Actions to State Court 
In 1995, the number of suits that forced even the most clean-
handed defendants into settlements hit a tipping point, and Congress 
enacted the PSLRA to take further action to constrain the types of 
suits that could find their way into federal court. Congress was 
primarily concerned with three troublesome practices: (1) vexatious 
strike suits that led to expensive settlements oftentimes unrelated to 
the merits of the suit,24 (2) imbalanced discovery costs,25 and (3) the 
 
 20. An implied right of action for violations of Rule 10b–5 has been consistently upheld by 
the Supreme Court. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). The 
Court has on several occasions defined the scope of both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. See 
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 & n.4 (2002) (extending the reach of Section 10(b) to 
include fraudulent schemes that merely “coincide” with the purchase or sale of securities, but 
clarifying that “our analysis does not transform every breach of fiduciary duty into a federal 
securities violation”); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (reiterating that 
although Section 10(b) regulates disclosure, “‘[c]orporations are creatures of state law’” and 
thus absent clear congressional intent, courts should not construe Section 10(b) in a way such 
that “the federal securities laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate 
law” (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 
(indicating that only purchasers and sellers may bring claims under Section 10(b)). 
 21. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 743 (“The Birnbaum rule . . . separates in a 
readily demonstrable manner the group of plaintiffs who actually purchased or actually sold, 
and whose version of the facts is therefore more likely to be believed by the trier of fact, from 
the vastly larger world of potential plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim but could 
seldom succeed in proving it.”). The Birnbaum rule states that only “actual purchasers and 
sellers of securities” may bring claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. Id. at 730. 
 22. Strike suits are defined as “suit[s] (esp[ecially] . . . derivative action[s]), often based on 
no valid claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). Strike suits “often follow sharp 
declines in a company’s stock price due to a missed earnings projection or other unfavorable 
news[] [and] generally allege that some fraud or misstatement by the company caused the stock 
price to plummet.” Larry Bumgardner, Class Action Shareholder Suits Face Legal Setbacks, 
GRAZIADIO BUS. REV. (2006), http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/class-action-shareholder-suits-
face-legal-setbacks. 
 23. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 
730 (noting that Congress saw “significant evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits”). 
 24. Id. These concerns mirror those emphasized by the Court in Blue Chip Stamps: “But to 
the extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of 
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chilling effect that litigation had on the disclosure of forward-looking 
statements.26 To remedy these respective problems, Congress enacted 
the PSLRA, which includes the following provisions: (1) heightened 
pleading requirements mandating that plaintiffs plead with 
particularity facts leading to a strong presumption of fraudulent 
behavior, (2) an automatic stay of discovery pending any motions to 
dismiss, and (3) a safe harbor for forward-looking statements.27 
In the years that immediately followed the enactment of the 
PSLRA, an unintended consequence arose: instead of encouraging 
the plaintiffs’ bar to more carefully consider the filing of securities-
fraud class actions, these suits migrated to state court where the 
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards and discovery stays did not 
reach.28 The evidence presented to Congress indicated that this was a 
new phenomenon; state class actions involving nationally traded 
securities, though available, had previously been uncommon.29 In 
response to this migration, Congress enacted SLUSA.30 
C. SLUSA Cut Off the State-Court Loophole 
1. SLUSA’s Purpose.  SLUSA was intended to prevent an end 
run around the PSLRA’s reforms and to ensure “national standards 
for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded 
 
a number of other people . . . rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal 
relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.” Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 741.  
 25. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 730 (“[T]he abuse 
of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the 
victimized party to settle . . . .”). 
 26. Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud 
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 290 (1998).  
 27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z–1, 78u–4 (2012); Perino, supra note 26, at 293. Other requirements 
include restrictions on who can qualify as a lead plaintiff and mandatory review of potential 
Rule 11 sanctions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z–1, 78u–4.  
 28. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 3–4 (1998). 
 29. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 (noting that prior to the PLRSA, “state-court litigation of 
class actions involving nationally traded securities had previously been rare”). For example, one 
study cited by Congress showed that about 26 percent of litigation activity had moved from 
federal to state court, largely as a result of a “substitution effect.” Joseph A. Grundfest & 
Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s Experience (Stanford Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 140, Feb. 1997). However, in a 
later paper Professor Perino noted that none of the three primary studies cited by Congress had 
“compile[d] any statistically significant data to support this inference.” Perino, supra note 26, 
at 299. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1–2 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).  
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securities.”31 SLUSA’s key provision precludes certain claims from 
being heard in either state or federal court.32 In particular, state-law 
claims that allege fraud or “misrepresentation . . . in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security” are subject to removal and 
dismissal.33 SLUSA also contains express exemptions from its 
preclusionary reach to mirror Delaware’s law on fiduciary duty of 
disclosure as written at the time of SLUSA’s enactment.34 
SLUSA, according to its proponents, was designed explicitly to 
cure what Congress perceived as a large failing of the PSLRA.35 In 
enacting SLUSA, Congress was not attempting to eliminate all 
remedies in state court, particularly not those remedies that were 
available in state court before either the PSLRA or SLUSA.36 
SLUSA also did not create any new substantive rights, but rather set 
forth a new jurisdictional rule about where certain types of cases 
could be heard.37 The language of SLUSA in many ways parallels that 
of Section 10(b): both include the phrase “in connection with”; both 
ban “manipulative or deceptive device[s]”; and both center around 
claims alleging fraud, misrepresentations, or omission.38 As might be 
 
 31. Id. at 2. The findings that prompted the enactment of SLUSA were not undisputed. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-640, at 45 (“Data compiled by unbiased sources shows that the number of 
state securities class actions has declined during the last year to pre-Reform Act levels.”). In 
fact, opponents of the statute felt it was premature. Id.  
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(1)–(2). This portion of SLUSA was originally referred to as a 
preemption provision, but the Court later deemed it to be a preclusion provision. See Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 636 n.1 (2006) (“The preclusion provision is often called a 
preemption provision; the Act, however, does not itself displace state law with federal law but 
makes some state-law claims nonactionable through the class-action device in federal as well as 
state court.”). However, because it is highly unlikely that individual plaintiffs will be able to 
bring claims in the context of breaches of fiduciary duty, the provision functions as a 
preemption. For further discussion of the implications of this provision, see infra notes 237–38 
and accompanying text. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the 
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 475, 477 (2002). 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10; see H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 1–2 (noting that SLUSA 
was enacted to “prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from 
being used to frustrate the objectives of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act”). 
 36. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 
112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (finding that that the need for uniform national standards for securities-
fraud lawsuits must be accomplished “while preserving the appropriate enforcement powers of 
State securities regulators”). 
 37. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 11 (“The solution to this problem is to make Federal 
court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class action litigation.”).  
 38. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78bb(f)(1)–(2), with id. § 78j.  
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expected, the Supreme Court has taken note of these similarities in 
interpreting SLUSA.39 
2. The Court’s Broad Interpretation of SLUSA’s Reach.  Though 
SLUSA was meant to address a particular problem, Congress drafted 
the statute using broad language, leading to some interpretive 
difficulties in the lower courts. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith Inc. v. Dabit,40 the Supreme Court addressed one issue that had 
divided the lower courts: whether SLUSA preempted claims by 
securities holders that could not have previously been brought in 
federal court under the Blue Chip Stamps rule.41 Dabit, a former 
Merrill Lynch broker, brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing on behalf of 
himself and other brokers, alleging that Merrill Lynch’s actions had 
caused them both to hold on to overvalued securities and to lose 
clients who believed they had been given bad advice.42 
Merrill Lynch’s motion to dismiss was granted, the district court 
finding that the claims fell “‘squarely within SLUSA’s ambit.’”43 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that even though the “in 
connection with” language must be read broadly, the standing 
requirements of Blue Chip Stamps were also imported into SLUSA’s 
interpretive scheme, and therefore the holding claims were not 
covered by SLUSA.44 A few months later in Kircher v. Putnam Funds 
Trust,45 the Seventh Circuit held the opposite, opining that SLUSA 
preempted even those claims for which there is no federal remedy.46 
 
 39. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006) 
(construing SLUSA in light of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 based on the presumption that “‘identical 
words used in different parts of the same statute . . . have the same meaning’” (quoting IBP, Inc. 
v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005))). 
 40. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006). 
 41. Id. at 84–85. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court held that only purchasers or sellers had 
standing to sue. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). 
 42. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 75–76.  
 43. Id. at 76 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02MDL1484(MP), 2003 WL 1872820, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003)).  
 44. Dabit v. Merrill Lych, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 51 (2d Cir. 2005), 
vacated, 547 U.S. 71.  
 45. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 633 
(2006). 
 46. See id. at 484 (“[P]laintiffs’ effort to define non-purchaser-non-seller classes is designed 
to evade PSLRA in order to litigate a securities class action in state court in the hope that a 
local judge or jury may produce an idiosyncratic award. It is the very sort of maneuver that 
SLUSA is designed to prevent.”). 
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In resolving this split, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kircher and heavily emphasized policy 
concerns in its reasoning. First, the Court examined the Blue Chip 
Stamps decision and determined that the Court there had relied on 
policy concerns to set the purchaser-seller limitation rather than 
purporting to interpret the language of the statute.47 According to the 
Court, this reliance on policy would have been clear to Congress 
when it drafted SLUSA.48 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, it would 
be contrary to Congress’s purpose in enacting SLUSA if holder 
claims such as Dabit’s were not precluded because the alleged 
misconduct was clearly securities fraud, regardless of which plaintiff 
was bringing the claim.49 Ultimately, the unanimous Court held that 
SLUSA was to be interpreted broadly to effect its stated purpose,50 
but it also acknowledged the importance of exemptions such as the 
Delaware carve-out.51 
D. State Fiduciary-Duty Claims and the Delaware Carve-Out 
So far this Note has described the evolution of certain federal 
securities laws. However, federal securities law inevitably overlaps 
with state corporate law. This overlap has become problematic in the 
context of interpreting SLUSA, in part because courts are allowing 
SLUSA to influence otherwise distinct areas of corporate law that it 
was not intended to touch. This Section first establishes that Congress 
did not intend for such an erosion. It then offers a brief description of 
the different fiduciary duties owed under Delaware law and highlights 
that their scope is far beyond, and oftentimes distinct from, that of 
federal securities laws. This distinction is important to understand 
when interpreting SLUSA’s reach. 
Before Congress passed the PSLRA, the possibility for 
concurrent state and federal securities-fraud litigation was always 
 
 47. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 84.  
 48. Id.  
 49. See id. at 86 (“As the Blue Chip Stamps Court observed, class actions brought by 
holders pose a special risk of vexatious litigation. It would be odd, to say the least, if SLUSA 
exempted that particularly troublesome subset of class actions from its pre-emptive sweep.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 50. See id. (“A narrow reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995 
Reform Act and thus run contrary to SLUSA’s stated purpose . . . .”). 
 51. See id. at 87 (“The statute carefully exempts from its operation certain class actions 
based on the law of the State in which the issuer of the covered security is incorporated . . . .”).  
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present.52 However, the use of state securities law to bring claims was 
often less desirable for class-plaintiffs than federal law due to, among 
other things, the absence of the availability of the fraud-on-the-
market theory under most state doctrines.53 Accordingly, when 
Congress enacted the PSLRA, it did not consider preemption of state 
corporate law.54 The statute was premised simply on a hope that the 
new procedural hurdles would discourage nonmeritorious suits. 
Only when the unexpected consequence of a migration to state 
courts was realized did Congress shift its focus to preempting state-
law claims.55 However, even then, preemption was in the field of 
securities regulation, not in the field of corporate law.56 Though the 
distinction between the two is not perfectly demarcated, a common 
description is that federal securities law regulates disclosure, whereas 
state law regulates the internal affairs of a corporation.57 And, 
historically, the force of the latter frequently occurs through state-law 
litigation that enforces the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers, 
directors, and controlling stockholders.58 Because corporations are 
themselves creatures of state law, it has long been common practice 
 
 52. See Perino, supra note 26, at 281 (noting that the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act “both 
contain explicit savings clauses that preserve state authority over securities matters”).  
 53. Id. at 284. In federal court under the fraud-on-the-market theory, plaintiffs need not 
show that each class member relied upon an alleged misrepresentation. Rather, plaintiffs are 
entitled to a presumption of reliance when the statements at issue are public. Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008). At the time of publication the 
Supreme Court was set to address the viability of the fraud-on-the-market theory. Halliburton 
Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3298 
(U.S. Nov. 15, 2013) (No. 13-317). 
 54. See Perino, supra note 26, at 287 (“Congress seems to have viewed litigation reform as 
a federal problem that required a federal solution. The legislative history contains only scattered 
references to state court, most of which are unrelated to the possibility of a shift in litigation 
strategy.”). For a summary of the argument that the PSLRA did actually preempt some state 
law of its own force, however, see id. at 318 n.188.  
 55. See O’Hare, supra note 34, at 489 (“To achieve the goals of [SLUSA], Congress 
decided to preempt a large number of actions brought in state court.”). 
 56. See id. at 502–03 (explaining the evolution of the Delaware carve-out as a preservation 
of state corporate law, in particular the duty of disclosure).   
 57. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (noting that the purpose 
of the 1934 Act was to promote disclosure and thus declining to extend the 1934 Act’s reach to 
internal affairs of the corporation); see also Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its 
Perplexing Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 884 (2006) 
(critiquing this “artificial boundary”). 
 58. See Jones, supra note 57, at 882 (“A background assumption that grounds much of 
corporate law scholarship is the notion that a separate sphere of state sovereignty exists in 
corporate law.”); id. at 882–88 (providing a critical analysis of the distinctions that limit the 
expansion of federal power into state corporate law). 
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to allow states to police the behavior of officers and directors, 
particularly as it relates to the internal affairs of the corporation and 
to relationships between directors, officers, and shareholders.59 
In light of this practice, the preemption conversations were not 
about sweeping reform in the fields of securities and corporate law, 
but rather about fixing a specific problem that Congress had 
accidentally created: the migration of traditionally federal claims to 
state court.60 Thus, even though SLUSA was designed to prevent the 
filing of certain securities-fraud actions in state court, the statute 
contains two express exemptions that effectuate a congressional 
intent to preserve the areas of securities law traditionally left to the 
states. The first exemption prevents preemption of exclusively 
derivative actions brought by shareholders on behalf of a 
corporation.61 The second exemption, which has two prongs, has come 
to be known as the “Delaware carve-out.” The carve-out allows 
certain types of class actions to remain in state court.62 It was modeled 
after the then-existing Delaware law surrounding the duty of 
disclosure,63 which extended only to situations in which shareholder 
action was requested, such as mergers, amendments to the articles of 
incorporation, and periodic elections of directors.64 The carve-out 
saves from SLUSA’s scope misconduct that occurs within the context 
of specific transactions that often will involve covered securities; 
however, due to the internal, corporate nature of the excluded 
transactions, state law will still produce the uniform result that 
SLUSA aims to achieve. 
When directors are requesting shareholder action, the fiduciary 
duty of disclosure mandates full and fair disclosure of all information 
 
 59. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.  
 60. See 143 CONG. REC. S10,477 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd) 
(“The legislation that we are introducing today, if enacted, will allow Congress to address this 
State litigation problem before it gets completely out of control. It will do so in a very targeted 
and narrow way, essentially preempting only those class actions that have recently migrated to 
State court . . . .”). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(C) (2012).  
 62. Id. § 78bb(f)(3).  
 63. O’Hare, supra note 34, at 476. 
 64. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). Though the Malone court extended this 
duty to other contexts, the scope of the carve-out remains unchanged despite some calls to 
expand it to reflect the new state of the law in Delaware. See O’Hare, supra note 34, at 477 
(“Prior to [Malone], the Delaware carve-out was coextensive with the Delaware law of fiduciary 
duty of disclosure.”).  
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within the board’s control.65 Though a breach of this duty may also 
rise to the level of a Section 10(b) action and does involve disclosure 
(an area typically regulated by federal law), a cause of action for 
breach of this disclosure obligation has long been available in state 
courts.66 Such an action involves an element similar to scienter,67 and 
most of the analysis centers around whether there has been a material 
omission or misstatement.68 However, at least in Delaware, an action 
for breach of the duty of disclosure does not include elements of 
reliance, causation, or economic loss, as is required for a Section 
10(b) action.69 By continuing to allow these actions in Delaware (or 
other states with similar laws), the experience and efficiency of the 
state courts in handling these types of actions is maintained,70 and 
presumably the reforms of the PSLRA are not evaded due to the 
longstanding nature of this type of action in state law.71 
This duty of disclosure in Delaware derives from a combination 
of the broader fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.72 These duties are 
identical for both officers and directors.73 Generally, the duty of 
loyalty “requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation and demands that there be no conflict between duty and 
self-interest.”74 The duty of care requires attentiveness to the 
corporation’s affairs, reasonably informed and deliberated 
 
 65. Malone, 722 A.2d at 12. 
 66. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (explaining that this duty of 
disclosure has been a “mainstay of Delaware law for decades” (citing Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 
224, 234 (Del. Ch. 1921))).  
 67. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 12 n.32 (noting that a good-faith, erroneous judgment of the 
scope or content of disclosure implicates the duty of care, not the duty of disclosure). Though 
the full scope of these duties is complex, situation specific, and beyond the province of this 
Note, it is important to highlight some elements of these claims to appreciate the difference 
between a claim for a breach of the duty of loyalty and a claim for securities fraud. For a more 
complete description of these duties, see generally 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 10:1–10:19, at 126–222 (3d ed. 2010). 
 68. Malone, 722 A.2d at 12. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Cf. O’Hare, supra note 34, at 502 (“[E]xperts were concerned that preempting fiduciary 
duty of disclosure claims would undercut important advantages offered by state courts, 
particularly in Delaware.”).  
 71. See id. at 502–03 (noting the concern that “preempti[on] [of] fiduciary duty of 
disclosure claims would undercut important advantages offered by state courts, particularly in 
Delaware”). In fact, some experts argued that keeping these claims in state court would help 
corporations expeditiously complete their transactions. Id. 
 72. Malone, 722 A.2d at 11.  
 73. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). 
 74. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  
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decisionmaking, and a substantive component that decisions have a 
rational basis.75 Both duties encompass a far broader range of 
circumstances and behaviors than the duty of disclosure. 
When bringing an action for breach of the duty of loyalty or care, 
a plaintiff first faces the burden of overcoming the business judgment 
rule.76 To overcome this presumption, the plaintiff must show both 
that the challenged decision was not made in a “good faith pursuit of 
a legitimate corporate interest” and that the decision was not made 
with due care.77 Alternatively, a cognizable claim for a breach of the 
duty of loyalty will be sufficient to overcome the business judgment 
presumption.78 Classic breaches of the duty of loyalty include self-
dealing transactions and usurping corporate opportunities.79 For 
example, when a director has a substantial financial stake in the 
outcome of a transaction she cannot be considered disinterested or 
independent.80 Not only does state law subject such self-dealing and 
disloyal transactions to rigorous scrutiny, but the burden of 
persuasion also falls on the self-interested director.81 
It is important to note that although most actions against 
corporate officers and directors lie with the corporation and therefore 
must be brought derivatively,82 it is also possible (albeit rare) for the 
action to lie directly with a shareholder and therefore not be covered 
by SLUSA’s express exemption for derivative suits. In deciding 
whether a claim is derivative or direct, Delaware courts look to “the 
nature of the wrong and to whom the relief should go.”83 Oftentimes 
 
 75. COX & HAZEN, supra note 67, § 10:3.  
 76. Gantler, 965 A.2d at 705–06. The business judgment rule provides officers or a board 
with “a strong presumption in its favor,” id. at 706, and “‘a court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the board if the . . . decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose,’” id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 
1985)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. at 706, 708.  
 78. Id. at 708.  
 79. COX & HAZEN, supra note 67, § 10:11. For a more complete analysis of the duty of 
loyalty and breaches thereof, see generally Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On 
Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 925–34 
(2006). 
 80. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993). 
 81. See id. at 361 (“If the [business judgment] rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors, the proponents of the challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact 
the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction to the shareholder plaintiff.”).  
 82. COX & HAZEN, supra note 67, § 10:18.  
 83. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del. 2004). 
Proceeding derivatively requires that the plaintiff also overcome a demand requirement, see 
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the distinction between whether an action is derivative or direct is 
complex84 and whether the suit proceeds derivatively or directly, it is 
not a less onerous process for a plaintiff than the procedural hurdles 
imposed by the PSLRA. Regardless, this distinction is a matter of 
state law and not a question that SLUSA attempts to answer. Rather, 
the carve-out attempts to fill in the gaps left open by the derivative-
action exception by exempting from SLUSA’s scope actions that are 
based predominantly on interactions between a company and its 
existing shareholders rather than on communications directed toward 
the market such as press releases and quarterly reports. 
This brief description of the different fiduciary duties owed 
under Delaware law highlights that their scope is far beyond, and 
oftentimes distinct from, that of the federal securities laws. Where the 
two spheres clearly overlap, Congress was swayed by arguments that 
claims in the overlapping area should stay in state court.85 Combining 
this with SLUSA’s stated goals seems to establish that most of these 
traditional state-law claims should remain unaffected by SLUSA’s 
reach. In fact, one of the primary reasons Congress ultimately 
included the carve-out was to preserve the “body of well-developed 
case law” that had developed in Delaware regarding fiduciary-duty 
claims.86 Unfortunately, this has not been the result. Lower courts 
have taken varying interpretive approaches, and a 2011 decision by 
the Seventh Circuit has risked the enforceability of an entirely new 
class of claims—in either state or federal court. 
II.  BROWN AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Over the years, the circuits have developed conflicting 
approaches to interpreting SLUSA’s preclusion provision and the 
Delaware carve-out. As discussed in this Part, the Seventh Circuit was 
not persuaded by any of the prevailing approaches and instead set 
 
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 (1991) (discussing the “contours of the 
demand requirement” in a derivative action), and perhaps prevail over a special litigation 
committee, see Kahn v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 834–35, 841 (Del. 2011) 
(describing these procedural challenges). 
 84. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 67, § 15:3 (“Courts frequently have great difficulty in 
classifying a plaintiff’s claim as individual or derivative.”).  
 85. See O’Hare, supra note 34, at 503 (“To avoid losing the benefits offered by state 
courts, . . . experts urged Congress to preserve claims based on a breach of fiduciary duty of 
disclosure. Ultimately, Congress was swayed by these arguments.”).  
 86. Id. at 502.  
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forth its own sweeping approach in Brown v. Calamos87 that 
eviscerates the very basis for the Delaware carve-out’s existence. This 
Part will first explore the intended function of the carve-out and 
describe some existing limits on SLUSA. It will then examine the 
circuit split that has developed regarding the scope of the preclusion 
provision. 
A. The Delaware Carve-Out and Other Limits on SLUSA’s Reach 
This Note so far has focused on what Congress did intend 
SLUSA to cover. To fully understand the implications of Brown, it is 
important to understand what Congress did not intend SLUSA to 
cover. This Section looks to the Delaware carve-out to establish a 
basis for determining more broadly what types of claims were not 
meant to be, and should not be, affected by SLUSA. The existence of 
the carve-out demonstrates an unambiguous intent to keep certain 
types of claims out of SLUSA’s reach and is therefore a good source 
for determining what should fall within its reach. This Section 
concludes with an analysis of a 2012 Fifth Circuit decision that 
considers a different question under SLUSA but presents important 
arguments regarding the implications of an overbroad approach. 
1. The Carve-Out at Work.  The Delaware carve-out is an express 
exemption from SLUSA’s preemptive sweep. Given that 
congressional intent carries great authority when construing an open-
ended statute such as SLUSA, it is fundamental to analyzing the types 
of claims that Congress meant to shield from SLUSA’s grasp. Apart 
from the carve-out, SLUSA does not preempt any derivative 
actions.88 While most duty-of-loyalty suits will proceed derivatively, 
this is not always the case, and it is a question with which federal 
courts may be especially unfamiliar, particularly as compared to state 
courts in Delaware.89 
The first prong of the carve-out saves transactions occurring 
exclusively between the issuer and its existing stockholders.90 Because 
one of Congress’s primary objectives with SLUSA was to create a 
uniform set of “national standards for nationally traded securities,”91 
 
 87. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(C) (2012). 
 89. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii)(I). 
 91. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998).  
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it is logical that nonmarket transactions would be exempt.92 
Furthermore, a corporation can expect that any action for breach of 
fiduciary duty would be brought under the laws of the state of 
incorporation, which underscores the rationality of the scope of this 
part of the carve-out. The Senate Banking Committee expressly 
stated that it was “not the intent of the Committee . . . to interfere 
with state law regarding the duties and performance of an issuer’s 
directors or officers in connection with a purchase or sale of securities 
by the issuer . . . from current shareholders.”93 This first prong should 
thus protect claims alleging, for example, that a director or officer 
caused the corporation to improperly redeem outstanding Class A 
shares to the detriment of Class B shareholders, even though a 
strikingly similar fact pattern in Brown was not evaluated under this 
prong.94 
The second prong of the carve-out preserves duty-of-disclosure 
claims that are related to certain corporate transactions requiring 
shareholder approval.95 To fit within this prong, three specific 
elements must be met: 
A covered class action may be maintained under SLUSA if it 
involves: (1) any recommendation, position, or other communication 
with respect to the sale of any issuer; (2) that is made by or on behalf 
of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity 
securities of the issuer; and (3) concerns decisions of such equity 
holders with respect to voting their securities, acting in response to a 
tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters’ or appraisal 
rights.96 
 
 92. Cf. G.F. Thomas Invs., L.P. v. Cleco Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 673, 682 (W.D. La. 2004) 
(“[P]art I of the Delaware carve-out provisions of SLUSA provides that only when shares of 
stock are purchased or sold to a limited market (that of the corporation’s current shareholders) 
will the Delaware carve-out provision apply. When the stock is offered to the open market, 
SLUSA governs the prospective class action.” (citing Zoren v. Genesis Energy, L.P., 195 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 603 (D. Del. 2002); Burekovitch v. Hertz, No. 01-CV-1277, 2001 WL 984942, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2001))).  
 93. S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6.  
 94. Though plaintiffs noted in a footnote in their motion for remand that this prong of the 
carve-out should apply, Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Remand at 6 n.1, 
Brown v. Calamos, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (No. 10-cv-6558), 2010 WL 5632736, 
defendants dismissed this argument without analysis in their notice of removal, Notice of 
Removal of Action Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 1446 Pursuant to Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act ¶ 6(b)(i), Brown, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (No. 10-cv-6558), 2010 WL 4236606, and 
neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue.  
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)(ii)(II). 
 96. Alessi v. Beracha, 244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358 (D. Del. 2003).  
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Once these elements are met, the second prong saves claims 
regarding, for example, material misrepresentations in proxies.97  
Generally, the applicability of the second prong should be 
straightforward (the suit is derivative, or not; the purchase or sale 
involved only current shareholders, or not; there was a request for 
shareholder action, or not). However, as explained in the remainder 
of this Part, not all questions under SLUSA are straightforward, and 
the types of claims Congress attempted to preclude from its reach are 
made clear when one looks to the carve-out. Accordingly, while 
courts cannot and should not force claims under the umbrella of the 
carve-out if they do not fit, the clear efforts of Congress to save 
certain types of claims from preemption—particularly those claims 
involving misconduct surrounding transactions between the 
corporation and its existing shareholders—are particularly relevant 
when making determinations about SLUSA’s scope. Unfortunately, 
not all circuits take this into consideration, though the Fifth Circuit 
did consider some other limits on SLUSA’s reach in its 2012 decision 
in Roland v. Green.98 
2. Roland v. Green and Limits on SLUSA.  Though Roland was 
predominantly concerned with establishing a standard for the Fifth 
Circuit to interpret the “in connection with” language of SLUSA,99 its 
reasoning about SLUSA’s intended scope is persuasive. Roland 
concerned “an alleged multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme perpetrated 
by R. Allen Stanford” and his corporate entities, and three 
consolidated cases stemming therefrom.100 The essence of the 
complaints was that plaintiffs had been sold certificates of deposit 
(CDs) that promised a high rate of return, and the defendants had 
represented that the CDs were backed by secure, liquid 
investments.101 The district court initially determined that the CDs 
were not “covered securities” within the meaning of SLUSA but 
continued its SLUSA analysis anyway.102 The court concluded that it 
 
 97. See Derdiger v. Tallman, 75 F. Supp. 2d 322, 325 (D. Del. 1999) (remanding a case 
where the defendant allegedly “misrepresented material facts in proxy statements” under the 
second prong of the carve-out).  
 98. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part sub nom. 
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 81 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-79). 
 99. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 100. Roland, 675 F.3d at 506.  
 101. Id. at 508.  
 102. Id. at 510 (quotation marks omitted).  
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must interpret the statute broadly and found that preclusion was 
warranted because the plaintiffs had been induced to believe that 
their CDs were backed by securities.103 The court therefore denied 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand and, in separate orders, dismissed two 
other companion cases based on its findings.104 
The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by this analysis and 
reversed,105 relying in large part on policy concerns.106 The court 
surveyed the approaches taken by the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits concerning the question of when a fraud 
or misrepresentation “coincide[s]” with a covered transaction.107 The 
court specifically inquired into how courts faced with similar Ponzi 
schemes interpreted SLUSA, noting three distinct approaches.108 It 
also noted the tension in the Supreme Court’s command that “in 
connection with” should be interpreted broadly, yet not so broadly as 
to convert every common-law fraud that involves nationally traded 
securities into a Section 10(b) violation.109 The court determined that 
it needed to balance the tension between the need to take the 
“connection” requirement seriously with policy and legislative intent 
considerations, “all of which militate against an overbroad 
 
 103. Id. The court went on to support its finding by noting that the scheme targeted retirees 
who were encouraged to roll over their retirement funds. Id. Because at least one plaintiff sold 
SLUSA-covered securities and used the proceeds to purchase the CDs, the court held that this 
was an independent ground to support SLUSA preclusion. Id. at 511.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 524.  
 106. See id. at 517 (“Given the Supreme Court’s express reliance on ‘policy considerations’ 
in its determination of the scope of the ‘in connection with’ language in Section 10(b), we find it 
useful to consider such arguments in our formulation of the standard.” (citations omitted) 
(citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975))).  
 107. Id. at 512–14. The court found that only the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had 
truly attempted to define this scope, rather than merely stating “what connection above and 
beyond ‘coincide’ is sufficient.” Id. at 512–13. The “coincide” test has its basis in SEC v. 
Zandford. See id. at 512; supra note 20. 
 108. Roland, 675 F.3d at 514–15 (“From our reading of these uncovered securities cases, we 
glean three approaches: (1) focus the analysis on whether the financial product purchased was a 
covered security (the ‘product approach’); (2) focus on the ‘separation’ between the investment 
in the financial product and the subsequent transactions (real or purported) in covered 
securities (the ‘separation approach’); and (3) focus on the ‘purpose(s)’ of the investment (the 
‘purposes approach’).”). 
 109. Id. at 512 (citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002)). The court was also 
attentive to the ongoing importance of state-law regulation. See id. at 518 (“Notably, state 
common law breach of fiduciary duty actions provide an important remedy not available under 
federal law.”).  
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formulation.”110 The court found that the test adopted by the Ninth 
Circuit best struck this balance. Under that test, SLUSA applies when 
a fraud is “more than tangentially related” to the purchase or sale of 
covered securities.111 Ultimately, the court reversed and embraced this 
approach, citing favorably to an amicus brief filed by Members of 
Congress that supported a more tailored reading of the statute than 
the one adopted by the district court.112 
Although this decision does not address the exact issue in Brown 
and its progeny, it nonetheless highlights important limiting principles 
that should be considered when interpreting SLUSA. First, SLUSA 
was intended to ensure predictable, uniform national standards for 
nationally traded securities, particularly in the case of market 
transactions that cut across state lines.113 That said, it was also 
designed to preserve the right of individuals to bring suit under state 
law, especially with respect to claims regarding internal corporate 
matters.114 Second, it is not enough to interpret SLUSA broadly; a 
broad interpretation must still effectuate the statute’s purpose. This 
cannot mean that SLUSA should be interpreted so broadly as to 
convert it from a shield against frivolous, disjointed litigation into a 
sword that eviscerates even the most meritorious of state-law claims 
simply because they have a distant connection to nationally traded 
securities, no matter how remote.115 
B. Misrepresentations, the Carve-Out, and a Circuit Split 
Despite Congress’s intentions to exclude certain types of claims 
from SLUSA’s grasp, a circuit split has developed over the meaning 
of “alleging a misrepresentation” and the meaning of the Delaware 
carve-out. This Section reviews the approaches taken by the Third, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits before looking to a decision out of the 
 
 110. Id. at 520.  
 111. Id. at 519–20.  
 112. Id. at 518 (quoting Amicus Curiae Brief of Certain Members of Congress in Support of 
Appellants and Addressing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act at 10, Roland, 675 
F.3d 503 (No. 11-11048), 2011 WL 6167175).  
 113. Id. at 517. 
 114. See id. at 518 (noting that it is important to “preserv[e] . . . the right of individuals to 
bring suit” (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 8 (1998)).  
 115. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Certain Members of Congress in Support of Appellants and 
Addressing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, supra note 112, at 7–8 (“‘[SLUSA] 
will permit meritorious claims to continue to be filed while preventing the migration of baseless 
class actions to state court.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 144 CONG. REC. H6055 (daily ed. 
July 21, 1998) (statement of Rep. Thomas Blilely))). 
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Seventh Circuit that not only further exacerbates this split but also 
completely guts the purpose of the carve-out without so much as 
acknowledging its importance. 
1. The Literalist Approach.  One approach in determining 
whether a state-law claim must be dismissed asks whether a complaint 
includes any allegations of the type that SLUSA bars, “pure and 
simple.”116 In Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.,117 the Sixth Circuit 
considered a case about a “planned corporate scheme” in which the 
bank-defendant Fifth Third allegedly invested in its own proprietary 
mutual funds rather than in the superior funds of its competitors.118 In 
considering whether the claim fell within SLUSA’s scope, the Sixth 
Circuit looked to the plain language of SLUSA and the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in Dabit to broadly interpret the statute to 
effectuate its purpose.119 Working under this artful pleading approach, 
the court observed that it was not the name of the claim or the words 
used to describe a cause of action that mattered; rather, it was the 
actual substance underlying the complaint.120 Accordingly, the court 
was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s emphasis on the elements of his 
state-law claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and 
unjust enrichment—none of which legally depended on 
misrepresentations.121 Ultimately, the court concluded that the 
combination of SLUSA’s broad language122 and Dabit’s directive123 left 
 
 116. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009). This has been 
dubbed the literalist approach. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 117. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2009).  
 118. Id. at 308, 310. 
 119. Id. at 310–11. Though the Supreme Court has not had occasion to interpret this 
particular passage of SLUSA, the Sixth Circuit found the Court’s interpretation of SLUSA’s “in 
connection with” language to be instructive. Id. at 310. 
 120. See id. at 310–11 (“The question under SLUSA is not whether the complaint uses the 
prohibited words . . . . It is whether the complaint covers the prohibited theories, no matter what 
words are used (or disclaimed) in explaining them.”). 
 121. Id. In fact, despite pronouncing that the plaintiff’s claim involved no 
misrepresentations, the claim actually announced that the “gravamen” of the plaintiff’s 
allegations was that Fifth Third had not dealt honestly with its beneficiaries on an ongoing basis 
while continually purchasing and selling nationally traded securities. Id. at 311. 
 122. See id. at 311 (“It asks whether the complaint includes these types of allegations, pure 
and simple.”). 
 123. See id. (“Add to this the Supreme Court’s admonition that SLUSA’s prohibitions must 
be ‘broad[ly]’ construed.” (alteration in original) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86 (2006))). 
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it with no choice but to hold that any action involving even a hint of 
misrepresentation must be dismissed.124 
In a later case, Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Management, Inc.,125 the 
Sixth Circuit emphasized that only those claims that fit expressly 
within the reach of the carve-out’s language will be saved from 
preclusion.126 The plaintiffs claimed that the value of their redeemable 
mutual-fund shares had declined due to the defendants’ unjustified 
risky behavior.127 The plaintiffs attempted to fit their claim within the 
first carve-out, which protects claims regarding “the purchase or sale 
of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from 
or to holders of equity securities of the issuer.”128 Thus, the plaintiffs 
asserted that their option to redeem shares qualified as a purchase 
despite their acknowledgement that they already held their shares 
when the misconduct began, making them merely holders.129 The 
court did not buy this neat trick or the argument that congressional 
intent did not extend to this type of claim, and held that the plaintiffs’ 
claim squarely fell within Dabit’s reach.130 
2. The Essential-to-Success Approach.  Contrasted with the Sixth 
Circuit, the Third Circuit takes a more nuanced view of whether a 
complaint alleges fraud or misrepresentation in connection with a 
covered transaction. The Third Circuit focuses not on every single 
word in a complaint but rather on only those allegations that are 
essential or necessary for the complaint’s success. In Rowinski v. 
Salomon Smith Barney Inc.,131 the Third Circuit addressed a complaint 
alleging that Salomon Smith Barney had disseminated biased 
research in violation of contracts with its brokerage clients and in 
violation of Pennsylvania consumer-protection laws.132 The court 
questioned separately whether the complaint “allege[d] a material 
 
 124. Id. at 310.  
 125. Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 126. Id. at 554.  
 127. Id. at 551–52.  
 128. Id. at 553 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(B) (2006)). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 554.  
 131. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 132. Id. at 297. 
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misrepresentation” and whether any misrepresentation was “in 
connection with” the purchase or sale of securities.133 
In Rowinski, allegations of misrepresentation were indisputably 
littered throughout the plaintiff’s complaint.134 For example, with 
respect to the plaintiff’s state-law breach-of-contract claim, the 
plaintiff alleged that Salomon breached its contracts to provide its 
brokerage clients with unbiased investment research when it 
disseminated biased research reports with artificially inflated 
ratings.135 The plaintiff argued that because misrepresentations or 
omissions were not a necessary legal element of such a claim under 
state law, SLUSA did not apply.136 The court reasoned that SLUSA 
requires only that an action “allege[]” misrepresentations,137 not that 
misrepresentation be the legal basis of the claim.138 On this plain 
reading of the statute, the court concluded that 
“[w]here . . . allegations of a material misrepresentation serve as the 
factual predicate of a state law claim, the misrepresentation prong is 
satisfied under SLUSA.”139 Here, the factual basis of the breach-of-
contract claim was that the reports, disseminated regularly (and often 
in connection with purchases and sales of securities), contained 
material misrepresentations. This, the court held, was enough to 
satisfy SLUSA preclusion. 
At first glance this might seem to be the same approach that the 
Sixth Circuit advocated in Segal, because the Third Circuit was also 
unwilling to take a formalistic approach based on the legal elements 
of a state-law claim. However, in a more nuanced case, the Third 
Circuit clarified its approach. In LaSala v. Bordier et Cie,140 a case 
involving a “classic ‘pump-and-dump’ scheme” executed by two 
 
 133. See id. at 299–300 (noting that “[t]he misrepresentation issue is straightforward” but 
“[t]he ‘in connection’ issue is more difficult”). Rowinski was decided before both Dabit and 
Kircher, so its approach was not influenced by either of those decisions.  
 134. See id. (“Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with allegations that . . . readily satisfy the 
misrepresentation requirement under SLUSA.”). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 300.  
 137. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2006)). 
 138. Id. This reading of the plain language of the statute adopted by the Third Circuit is in 
line with the definition of “allegation” in Black’s Law Dictionary. Black’s defines “allegation” 
as “[s]omething declared or asserted as a matter of fact” and distinguishes it from a “material 
allegation,” which is “an assertion that is essential to the claim.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
86–87 (9th ed. 2009).  
 139. Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added).  
 140. LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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directors of the now-bankrupt AremisSoft who covered their tracks 
by running money through two Swiss banks,141 the court distinguished 
between necessary factual allegations and extraneous allegations that 
need not have been pleaded.142 Under this approach, an allegation is a 
factual predicate to a claim, and therefore requires SLUSA 
preclusion if it “gives rise to liability.”143 For example, in Rowinski, 
there would have been no breach of contract without the fraudulent 
reports—there was no way to factually disentangle the fraud from the 
claims or the improper transactions. Conversely, due to the unique 
nature of Swiss law in LaSala, any claims that the directors of the 
Swiss banks had violated their fiduciary duties did not require a 
showing of misrepresentation—any description of such behavior 
could have been omitted and a viable claim would have stood under 
Swiss law.144 
Despite this arguably more lenient essential-to-success approach, 
plaintiffs nonetheless cannot circumvent SLUSA by omitting an 
allegation of a misrepresentation if, whether or not properly pled, a 
factual allegation of misrepresentation is evident from a reasonable 
understanding of the complaint.145 To make this determination, the 
Third Circuit agrees with other circuits that a court should look 
beyond the face of a complaint.146 However, contrary to the approach 
of the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit has also established that every 
passing mention of a possible misrepresentation does not trigger 
SLUSA.147 This distinction between the actually complained-of 
misconduct and other extraneous details allows a court to both 
broadly interpret SLUSA as required by Dabit, yet also be mindful of 
 
 141. Id. at 126.  
 142. Id. at 141.  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. LaSala, 
519 F.3d at 141 (“In other words, when one of a plaintiff’s necessary facts is a misrepresentation, 
the plaintiff cannot avoid SLUSA by merely altering the legal theory that makes that 
misrepresentation actionable.” (emphasis added)). 
 146. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 301 (joining other courts in “scrutiniz[ing] the pleadings to 
arrive at the ‘essence’ of a state law claim, in order to prevent artful drafting from circumventing 
SLUSA preemption”). 
 147. See LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141 (“While it may be unwise . . . to set out extraneous 
allegations of misrepresentations in a complaint, the inclusion of such extraneous allegations 
does not operate to require that the complaint must be dismissed under SLUSA.”). 
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the purposes of the Delaware carve-out when determining whether a 
claim must be precluded.148 
3. The Distinct-Claim Approach.  The Ninth Circuit offers yet 
another approach to making this determination, in which to avoid 
preclusion, the claim must be “distinct” from those claims alleging 
fraud.149 In crafting this approach, the Ninth Circuit has favorably 
cited to both the Sixth Circuit literalist approach and the Third 
Circuit essential-to-success approach without acknowledging a 
difference between the two.150 The Ninth Circuit has also suggested 
that if “the essence” of a claim is based on fraudulent behavior then 
the claim is precluded151 and that misrepresentation need not be a 
legal element of a claim for that claim to be precluded.152 For example, 
a breach-of-contract claim, such as the claim in Rowinski, would still 
be dismissed under this distinct-claim approach, because the essence 
of the claim is grounded in fraud rather than in simple breach of 
contract. In contrast, a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim alleging that a 
corporation improperly benefitted one class of shareholders to the 
detriment of another would not be dismissed under this approach.153 
The most notable feature of the Ninth Circuit’s approach is its 
willingness to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their 
complaints to avoid SLUSA’s reach. The court has recognized the 
potential for “artful pleading” as a way to circumvent the reach of the 
statute,154 but it has been equally concerned with the inequity 
surrounding dismissal of valid state-law claims merely because a 
defendant was able to construe them as federal in nature.155 Though 
only dicta, this concern suggests that the distinct-claim approach is 
 
 148. See id. at 135 (“Congress did not intend SLUSA to reach any corporate-originated 
claims . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).  
 149. See Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the claim 
must be precluded “because Madden’s complaint cannot be read as making a distinct claim” 
separate from the misrepresentations alleged elsewhere in the complaint (emphasis added)). 
 150. Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1222 n.13 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 151. Stoody–Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., 442 F. App’x 247, 248 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 152. Id. (citing Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1222 n.13).  
 153. See id. at 249 (“[A] complaint may allege a violation of . . . fiduciary duty . . . so long as 
the complaint does not allege, either expressly or implicitly, misrepresentations, omissions, or 
fraudulent practices . . . .”).  
 154. Id.; see U.S. Mortg., Inc. v. Saxton, 494 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2007) (remarking that “a 
plaintiff may avoid SLUSA dismissal through amendment” (emphasis omitted)). 
 155. Saxton, 494 F.3d at 843.  
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perhaps the most deferential to the traditional balance in this field 
between state and federal realms of influence.156  
C. Brown v. Calamos and the Dismantling of the Delaware Carve-
Out 
Despite the availability of these three approaches, the Seventh 
Circuit’s Brown decision crafted a new approach to this question that 
underscores the risks inherent in an overbroad interpretation of 
SLUSA. As this Part highlights, Brown effectively condones a 
practice by defendants of using the protections of SLUSA not as a 
shield from meritless litigation but as a sword against legitimate state-
law claims. 
In Brown, the Seventh Circuit was faced with interpreting a 
claim for breach of fiduciary obligation that expressly disclaimed any 
allegations of securities fraud.157 The plaintiff class was composed of 
owners of the common stock of a closed-end investment fund.158 The 
fund also issued shares of “auction market preferred stock” (AMPS), 
for which interest rates were set through an auction process.159 When 
the market crashed in 2008, the market for the AMPS dried up, and 
the owners of the preferred stock were stuck with the low interest 
rates set at the most recent auction.160 Though not obligated to do so, 
the fund redeemed the preferred shares at a price above their market 
price.161 The fund did replace this money, but had to do so by 
borrowing at much higher interest rates on shorter term paper, 
thereby increasing the risk to the fund.162  
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the fund only bought back 
the AMPS “to curry favor with the investment banks and brokerage 
houses,” which Calamos, the fund’s parent, relied upon to market 
 
 156. Cf. Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 971 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The testimony before 
Congress . . . suggests that the purpose of [the carve-out] was to preserve state-law actions 
brought by shareholders against their own corporations in connection with extraordinary 
corporate transactions requiring shareholder approval . . . .”).  
 157. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 158. Id. at 125.  
 159. Id. The fund invested the capital it obtained from common shareholders and preferred 
shareholders. Id. Any return on investment, minus the fund’s expenses (including dividends 
paid to the preferred shareholders), benefitted the common stockholders, who effectively were 
the owners of the fund. Id. 
 160. Id. at 126.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
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shares in its future funds.163 As articulated by the court, “[T]he parent 
sold its child . . . down the river, in breach of its fiduciary obligations 
to the fund’s common shareholders, in order to placate banks and 
brokers.”164 The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated the 
directors’ duties “not to unfairly favor the interest of one class of 
shareholders over another . . . [and] not to cause one class of 
shareholders to receive a benefit greater than that to which they are 
entitled at the expense of another class of shareholders.”165 The 
complaint did not include any allegations of fraud or 
misrepresentation, but it did include reference to a public statement 
made by the fund that the AMPS’s term would be perpetual.166 
The Seventh Circuit followed the lead of other circuits in looking 
beyond the face of the complaint—but went even further. Based on 
one sentence in the complaint,167 the court determined that the 
plaintiffs were “at least implicitly” alleging that the fund had made 
misleading omissions by not warning the common stockholders of the 
potential for future self-dealing.168 From there, the court embarked on 
an imaginative journey to predict the potential course of future 
litigation, including various arguments the plaintiffs might have 
made.169 Despite the hypothetical nature of this analysis, it was central 
to the court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims with 
prejudice.170 
In determining which approach applied, the court analyzed and 
rejected the approaches of the Sixth, Third, and Ninth Circuits and 
 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Complaint at 21, Brown, 664 F.3d 123 (No. 10-cv-06558).  
 166. Brown, 664 F.3d at 126.  
 167. This sentence read: “The Fund’s public statements indicated that the holders of its 
common stock could realize, as one of the significant benefits of this investment, leverage that 
would continue indefinitely, because . . . the term of the AMPS was perpetual.” Complaint, 
supra note 165, at 6. 
 168. See Brown, 664 F.3d at 127 (“A misleading omission is also alleged, at least 
implicitly: . . . an allegation of failure to disclose a conflict of interest that if disclosed would 
have given pause to potential investors.”).  
 169. See id. at 126–27 (noting that the quoted passage of the complaint did not say the fund 
had made a misrepresentation “in so many words” but nonetheless determined that a jury 
“might” find this missing statement “insinuated” an essential element of the complaint); see also 
id. at 131 (returning to this line of inferences as a key reason for refusing to allow leave to 
amend the complaint). 
 170. See id. at 131 (observing that any potential amendment would not be credible “if we are 
correct that the allegation [of fraud] may well be central to the plaintiff’s case” (emphases 
added)).  
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formulated a new approach somewhere between that of the Sixth and 
Third Circuits.171 In rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s literalist approach, the 
court expressed concern about the ambiguity surrounding the word 
“alleging,” noting that essentially everything in a complaint is an 
allegation but also acknowledging that not everything is a “charge[] of 
misconduct for which the plaintiff is seeking relief.”172 The court also 
was, somewhat ironically, mindful that the literalist approach “could 
lead to inconclusive haggling over whether an implication of fraud 
could be extracted from allegations in the complaint that did not 
charge fraud directly.”173 In rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s distinct-claim 
approach, the court doubted that allowing the dismissal of claims 
without prejudice would not undercut SLUSA’s purpose.174 In 
addition, the court was leery that the Third Circuit’s essential-to-
success approach would allow plaintiffs to slide so-called “inessential” 
allegations of fraud back into future litigation once they had avoided 
preclusion by removing those same claims.175 Ultimately, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs’ case would be doomed under any 
standard, but settled on a standard whereby a suit is “barred by 
SLUSA only if the allegations of the complaint make it likely that an 
issue of fraud will arise in the course of the litigation.”176 
Though this approach purports to leave the door open for duty-
of-loyalty claims to proceed without being barred by SLUSA, the 
court’s discussion of how this particular suit might have proceeded 
untouched makes that open door seem more like a mouse hole. This 
approach also ignores a key component of the carve-out analysis: the 
nature of the transaction in which the alleged misconduct took place. 
According to the court, had the fund originally said nothing about the 
benefits of its format of leverage and investment, and had the fund 
mentioned that any redemption of the AMPS might be motivated by 
self-interested concerns about future relationships with investment 
 
 171. Id. at 128–29.  
 172. Id. at 128.  
 173. Id. Despite the Seventh Circuit’s concern about this “inconclusive haggling,” the court 
spent a sizable portion of its opinion doing just that—attempting, ex ante, to predict what would 
or would not become a central issue in any future litigation. 
 174. See id. at 127 (“An intermediate approach, found in Stoody–Broser v. Bank of 
America, . . . allows the removed suit to be dismissed without prejudice . . . . We are doubtful 
about this approach.” (citation omitted)).  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 128–29.  
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banks, the suit might have been able to proceed.177 The court refused 
to recognize the plaintiffs’ assertion that the misconduct was 
unrelated to Calamos’s initial sales pitch but instead stemmed from its 
redemption of the AMPS from the preferred shareholders to the 
detriment of the fund.178 Furthermore, the court indicated that every 
allegation of a conflict of interest or breach of the duty of loyalty 
would implicitly include an omission or misrepresentation.179 This 
represents a potentially massive intrusion into the state-law domain 
that is neither mandated by—nor an intended result of—SLUSA. 
III.  ANALYZING THE APPROACHES 
As explained in Part II, lower courts have taken varying 
approaches to interpreting SLUSA’s reach, particularly as their 
interpretations relate to the scope of the Delaware carve-out. 
Although the Supreme Court’s precedent counsels in favor of a broad 
interpretation of the statute’s reach,180 this reading is necessarily 
constrained by due regard for congressional intent, existing judicial 
interpretations of related statutes, and federalism considerations. 
Federalism is particularly important given the historical role it has 
played in interpreting the overlap between federal and state securities 
 
 177. Id. at 129; see also id. (explaining that, while not barred by SLUSA, such a suit “would 
have to be brought as a derivative suit”).  
 178. Id. at 130.  
 179. See id. (“The allegation of fraud would be difficult and maybe impossible to disentangle 
from the charge of breach of the duty of loyalty . . . . [N]o sane investor would knowingly put 
himself at the mercy of a disloyal investment manager . . . .”). Interestingly, in an earlier opinion 
also authored by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the idea that every broken 
promise amounts to a misrepresentation or fraud. See Consolidation Servs., Inc. v. KeyBank 
Nat’l Ass’n, 185 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 1999) (“CSI’s lawyer labors under a deep 
misunderstanding of the meaning of the word ‘misrepresentation.’ To him, a promise that is not 
fulfilled, for whatever reason, is a misrepresentation. This view would turn every breach of 
contract into a fraud.”). The court went on to say that absent other evidence, when a party 
makes a promise, but later for some reason changes her mind, this simply does not amount to 
fraud. See id. (“A promise is fraudulent only if it misrepresents the promisor’s state of 
mind . . . .”). This seems to be exactly what the court called fraud in Brown—the fund originally 
indicated that the term of the AMPS would be perpetual, but later changed its mind. Brown, 
664 F.3d at 126–27. That the fund had a bad-faith reason for changing its mind should not 
impact whether the original statement was a misrepresentation, particularly when the statement 
itself was not at issue. See Consolidation Servs., 183 F.3d at 823 (holding that a promise is 
fraudulent if at the time it was made it misrepresents the promisor’s state of mind, with any later 
change of mind not bearing on this initial determination). These holdings are in deep conflict. 
 180. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006) (“The 
background, the text, and the purpose of SLUSA’s pre-emption provision all support [a] broad[] 
interpretation . . . .”).  
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law.181 This Part examines the historical reach of Section 10(b) and 
relevant federalism concerns related to the separation of federal 
securities law and state fiduciary-duty law. This Part also highlights 
the problems inherent in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ approaches 
to interpreting SLUSA. 
A. “Alleging a Misrepresentation”—Looking to Section 10(b) for 
Guidance 
1. The Limits on the Reach of Section 10(b) Should Inform 
SLUSA’s Preemptive Reach.  The language of SLUSA bears striking 
similarities to the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.182 
Further indicating the parallel nature of the two provisions, the Joint 
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference replaced the 
omission and misrepresentation language of SLUSA with the word 
“fraud” when describing its purpose.183 Therefore, as the Supreme 
Court has done, it is appropriate as a matter of statutory 
interpretation to construe the two provisions as having the same 
meaning.184 
Unfortunately, courts have not always clearly defined the full 
scope of what constitutes a meritorious Section 10(b) action—and in 
particular, the interpretation of the “in connection with” 
requirement.185 Congress would have been aware of this ambiguity 
when enacting both the PSLRA and SLUSA, and it could have opted 
to clarify it.186 The Supreme Court has said that the PSLRA, rather 
than clarifying this muddied area, actually codified judicial 
 
 181. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.  
 182. For comparison of the language of the two statutory provisions, see supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. Rule 10b–5 specifically provides that it is unlawful “[t]o employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “[t]o make any untrue statement . . . or to omit to state a 
material fact.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b–5(a) to (b) (2013). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); see also Magyery v. Transamerica 
Fin. Advisors, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 954, 961 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (noting that “the word ‘fraud’ [in 
the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference] is used in place of the 
misrepresentation or omission language in the statute” because Congress intended federal 
courts to be “the exclusive venue for most securities class action lawsuits”).  
 184. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85–86; see supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 185. See O’Hare, supra note 10, at 329 & n.29 (collecting sources describing the difficulty 
courts have had in establishing a clear test for the “in connection with” requirement).  
 186. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 77 (2012) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to have adopted 
prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new 
version.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997) (“[W]e presume that 
Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court’s precedents . . . .”).  
GLASS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  3:31 PM 
1366 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1337 
interpretations of the Rule 10b–5 implied right of action up to that 
point.187 Because of this, SLUSA cannot substantively extend the 
reach of Section 10(b) but rather procedurally makes federal court 
the only venue for these actions.188 It therefore is helpful to consider 
exactly what misconduct Congress wanted litigated and where—if 
anywhere—Congress intended for such litigation to take place in the 
first instance. 
As an illustration, Brown’s interpretation of the reach of SLUSA 
leaves directors and officers with an interesting choice. They can fully 
disclose any unfair act they would like to carry out before acting.189 In 
that event, according to the Seventh Circuit, a state claim is not 
precluded by SLUSA and investors can proceed with an action in 
state court.190 Alternatively, they can decide not to disclose their 
planned self-dealing. In addition to self-dealing, this commits 
directors and officers to an omission, at the very least, which thus bars 
any state-law fiduciary-duty claims because plaintiffs would likely 
allege such omissions, even if the allegation is implicit. However, 
investors would most likely be left with no remedy at all because it is 
highly likely that a director or officer who mistreats a class of 
shareholders for her own benefit would do so without first warning 
them so that, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach in interpreting 
SLUSA, the suit would be removed to federal court. Once in federal 
court, the allegations would be judged by the Court’s Section 10(b) 
jurisprudence, under which it is likely that the director or officer’s 
actions, though dishonest, would not rise to the level of deception 
required for a successful Section 10(b) claim.191 
 
 187. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008) 
(“It is appropriate for us to assume that when § 78u–4 was enacted, Congress accepted the 
§ 10(b) private cause of action as then defined but chose to extend it no further.”). 
 188. This is not to disagree with or disregard the holding in Dabit. As the Court noted there, 
the specific misconduct at issue was identical to that of a typical Section 10(b) suit and therefore 
“unquestionably qualifie[d] as fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.” 
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 89 (quotation marks omitted). 
 189. See Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 129 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that defendants 
who make a full and accurate disclosure at the outset might prevent later allegations of fraud 
but not of a breach of the duty of loyalty).  
 190. Id.  
 191. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977) (“[T]he failure to give 
advance notice [is] not a material nondisclosure within the meaning of the statute or the 
Rule.”).  
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Much as no sane investor would subject herself to a disloyal 
investment manager,192 it seems unlikely that any rational director 
would subject herself to suit when she could hide behind SLUSA 
instead. Although the Court in Dabit brought misconduct that was 
clearly actionable under Section 10(b) (albeit by a different plaintiff) 
within SLUSA’s scope, the Seventh Circuit brings within SLUSA’s 
grasp a whole new sweep of misconduct regarding certain types of 
corporate affairs that have never been actionable under Section 
10(b). This cannot be the result Congress intended. 
2. The Seventh Circuit Takes the Artful Pleading Doctrine Too 
Far.  Because SLUSA includes a preclusion provision, it should be 
subject to the artful pleading doctrine.193 Under this maxim, a court 
looks behind the words of a complaint to determine the true nature of 
the claim, typically for the purpose of determining whether a federal 
court has subject matter jurisdiction. Appellate courts have 
consistently applied the artful pleading doctrine when determining 
whether SLUSA mandates removal and dismissal.194 
The artful pleading doctrine prevents plaintiffs from avoiding 
removal when it is in fact proper,195 and thus the doctrine is 
particularly applicable to SLUSA. The artful pleading doctrine allows 
a court—not the parties—to make these important removal 
 
 192. See supra note 179. 
 193. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 520 (5th Cir. 2012) (explaining that under the artful 
pleading doctrine “even though the plaintiff has artfully avoided any suggestion of a federal 
issue, removal is not defeated by the plaintiff’s pleading skills in hiding [a] federal question” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Bernhard v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 
2008) (quotation mark omitted))). In most circumstances, the plaintiff is the master of her 
complaint, see Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22 
(1983) (“[W]e have often repeated that ‘the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law 
he will rely upon’ . . . .” (quoting The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 
(1913))), and the well-pleaded-complaint rule enables a plaintiff to “avoid federal jurisdiction 
by exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
However, in the event that an area of state law is preempted by federal law, courts will employ 
the artful pleading doctrine to ensure that the plaintiff cannot skirt removal by strategically 
avoiding any mention of federal questions in her pleadings. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 
22 (“[I]t is an independent corollary of the well-pleaded-complaint rule that a plaintiff may not 
defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint.”). The doctrine 
also applies “when Congress has . . . expressly provided for the removal of particular actions 
asserting state law claims.” Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 519 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 194. See, e.g., Roland, 675 F.3d at 520 (explaining that there are two situations in which the 
artful pleading doctrine applies and that SLUSA qualifies under both); Romano, 609 F.3d at 519 
(same); Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310–11 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a 
claimant cannot avoid SLUSA’s application through artful pleading). 
 195. Romano, 609 F.3d at 518–19. 
GLASS IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  3:31 PM 
1368 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1337 
determinations. Eliminating the potential to evade the PSLRA was a 
primary objective of Congress in enacting SLUSA, and the ability to 
simply disclaim or plead around SLUSA would severely undermine 
this goal.196 Accordingly, courts should continue to look beyond the 
face of a well-pleaded complaint in search for “a securities fraud wolf 
dressed up in a breach of contract [or fiduciary duty] sheep’s 
clothing,”197 as courts, including the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits, are doing.  
What the artful pleading doctrine does not do is give courts an 
opportunity to turn nonpreempted state claims into federal claims—
though this is exactly what happened in Brown. SLUSA’s preclusive 
effect should be limited to only those state-law claims alleging actions 
essentially amounting to securities fraud.198 It is doubtful, for example, 
that any court would read a complaint that alleges simple theft of 
one’s security portfolio to be preempted by federal securities law 
because there has been some preemption in the field. That is 
effectively what the Seventh Circuit held in Brown, however. By 
reading complaints so broadly as to turn every state-law claim that 
happens to involve some amount of dishonesty and some connection 
to nationally traded securities into allegations of fraud, the court cast 
too wide a net for a statute described as a “targeted” solution to a 
specific problem.199 The Seventh Circuit’s decision not only extends 
the bounds of SLUSA and the general rules about pleadings, but also 
implicates important federalism concerns. 
 
 196. See Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698, 702 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The issue of 
preemption thus hinges on the content of the allegations—not on the label affixed to the cause 
of action.”). 
 197. Felton v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 429 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
There is a difference between a plaintiff who states a valid cause of action that simply does not, 
under any reading, implicate SLUSA, and a plaintiff who pleads around it. Cf. Green v. 
Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 599 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that an amended complaint deleting 
any reference to purchase or sale of securities, including amending the prayer for relief, 
sufficiently removed the complaint from SLUSA’s ambit). For an argument in favor of allowing 
plaintiffs to actually plead around SLUSA, see O’Hare, supra note 10, at 373–75. Professor 
O’Hare is wary that courts will not be able to tell the difference between a plaintiff who is 
attempting to evade SLUSA and one who is pleading a noncovered claim. See id. at 375 (“If 
plaintiffs are not permitted to plead around SLUSA, courts will be forced to expend substantial 
resources to determine whether they should re-write the plaintiff’s claim in order to preempt 
it.”). 
 198. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2012) (banning securities fraud); see also supra note 60. 
 199. See supra note 60. 
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B. Federalism Concerns Counsel Against an Overbroad 
Interpretation of SLUSA 
Federalism concerns were at the forefront of congressional 
debates over SLUSA. Though there have been arguments against the 
dual state-federal securities regulation system,200 the fields of 
corporate law and securities law have historically operated under a 
dual system of regulation—states regulate corporations, including the 
behavior of officers and directors, and the federal government 
regulates nationally traded securities.201 Though the separation 
between the two spheres has never been absolute, SLUSA as enacted 
(but perhaps not as currently interpreted) cannot be said to have 
dramatically disrupted this balance.202 
1. The Delicate Balance Between State and Federal Regulation of 
Corporations Would Be Disrupted if the Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
Were Adopted.  Historically, there has been mutual respect for the 
boundaries of these spheres of regulation.203 When interpreting the 
reach of Section 10(b), the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
acknowledged these boundaries.204 The Fifth Circuit took this into 
account when formulating its interpretation of SLUSA’s “in 
connection with” requirement in Roland.205 The Third Circuit’s 
approach, which looks only to those allegations that are essential to 
success, 206 also allows room for courts to respect this balance. 
 
 200. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974) (“In the management of corporate affairs, state statutory and case 
law has always been supreme, with federal intrusion limited to the field of securities regulation. 
Perhaps now is the time to reconsider the federal role.”). 
 201. See Jones, supra note 57, at 884 (noting that courts frequently insist on “maintaining a 
bright line between the corporate and securities law domains”); supra note 59.  
 202. In fact, courts have recognized this limit on SLUSA’s reach. See, e.g., Rowinski v. 
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (“SLUSA furthers the uniform 
application of federal fraud standards without expanding or constricting the substantive reach of 
federal securities regulation.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006))).  
 203. See O’Hare, supra note 34, at 501 (“Just as the Delaware courts have sought to respect 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, Congress has attempted to respect state 
corporate law.”).  
 204. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002) (“[O]ur analysis does not 
transform every breach of fiduciary duty into a federal securities violation.”); Gochnauer v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Since not every instance of 
financial unfairness or breach of fiduciary duty will constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b) 
or Rule 10b–5, federal courts should be wary of foreclosing common law breach of fiduciary 
duty actions which supplement existing federal or state statutes.”).  
 205. Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 518 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 206. For a description of the essential-to-success approach, see supra Part II.B.2. 
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The lack of federal fiduciary standards must also inform the 
interpretation of SLUSA’s reach. Before SLUSA, states had 
securities laws that predated the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.207 There 
were (and still are) no such national standards governing fiduciary 
relationships.208 Despite proposals,209 Congress has not chosen to 
create such standards even though this regulation seems within the 
realm of its Commerce Clause power.210 After decades of a dual-
regulation approach to securities law, SLUSA represents a departure 
from this practice. If SLUSA is interpreted to preempt even the most 
traditional of state-law fiduciary-duty claims without providing any 
substitute, this would represent the potential for a complete 
elimination of remedies. Courts should require that Congress speak 
more clearly before construing SLUSA to effect such a result.211 
2. The Seventh Circuit Brings Within SLUSA’s Reach Many 
Traditional State Claims.  SLUSA was specifically designed to 
preserve traditional state-law powers and to stop the migration of 
suits from federal court to state court, thereby ensuring a level of 
uniformity.212 Fiduciary-duty claims have long been brought in state 
court, typically a court in an issuer’s state of incorporation, and they 
do not pose the risk of vexatious litigation about which courts 
interpreting SLUSA have been wary.213 Many of those who opposed 
SLUSA felt that states could handle this migration to state courts on 
 
 207. Perino, supra note 26, at 279.  
 208. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 518 (“Notably, state common law breach of fiduciary duty 
actions provide an important remedy not available under federal law.”).  
 209. See, e.g., Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, 94th Cong. 57 (1976) (Statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr., Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis 
& Pogue) (“[T]here is a lot to be said for a Federal corporation law that would be of an 
‘enabling’ sort, similar to those that exist in States . . . .”); Cary, supra note 200, at 701–02 
(proposing a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act).  
 210. Cary, supra note 200, at 703.  
 211. Cf. Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“If Congress had 
intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would 
have expressed that intent more clearly.”). 
 212. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) (noting 
that Congress enacted SLUSA both to prevent plaintiffs from “bringing class actions under 
state law, often in state court” and to “‘prevent certain State private securities class action 
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of’ the Reform Act” (quoting 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 
3227)). 
 213. See O’Hare, supra note 34, at 499 n.98 (explaining that although “courts were primarily 
concerned with respecting the traditional roles of state and federal law . . . , [t]hey were . . . also 
worried that Delaware courts would become a haven for frivolous securities litigation”). 
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their own if they felt it necessary.214 Indeed, states can address any 
potential vexatious securities-fraud litigation problems that may arise 
in their courts; in fact, they have already done so in the area of 
corporate law through heightened procedural requirements for 
bringing class or derivative suits, and through the business judgment 
rule.215 Some Members of Congress were concerned that SLUSA was 
solving a problem that did not exist;216 the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of SLUSA risks validating this concern by entangling 
all breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty with fraud. 
* * * 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the Third Circuit’s 
approach is mindful that sometimes claims will include facts or 
allegations that need not be included.217 Though a narrative in a 
complaint might include historical information that implies potential 
misrepresentations, it will not always rise to the level of being 
essential to success. Furthermore, any presence of a 
misrepresentation or omission does not automatically satisfy 
SLUSA’s misrepresentation-in-connection-with-a-securities-trade 
requirement.218 This essential-to-success approach is a useful starting 
point for courts looking to balance SLUSA’s necessarily broad reach 
post-Dabit with the federalism concerns that underpin its enactment.  
IV.  GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE MATTER: HOW COURTS 
SHOULD APPROACH SLUSA INTERPRETATION 
Given the tumultuous nature of post–Great Recession securities 
markets, it is essential that Congress’s intent to protect corporations 
from meritless strike suits be effectuated wherever appropriate. 
However, this should not be done at the expense of small investors 
and others harmed by the self-dealing actions of directors and 
 
 214. California, the state most impacted, did in fact propose legislation to address the 
increase in court filings. See Perino, supra note 26, at 274 n.3 (“Another by-product of the 
[PSLRA] was a bruising political battle over California’s Propositions 201 and 211, two 
competing state ballot initiatives. Proposition 201 purported to apply many of the [PSLRA]’s 
provisions to state causes of actions, whereas Proposition 211 would have established private 
securities fraud causes of action that were more plaintiff-favorable than federal law.”). 
 215. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 31. 
 217. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
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officers. This Part advocates a two-pronged approach to interpreting 
SLUSA that should help to balance these concerns. Under the first 
prong, courts should determine whether the suit at issue is of the type 
Congress was attempting to eliminate. In particular, courts should 
look to whether the specific transaction involved is of the type 
exempted by the Delaware carve-out. From there, courts should 
proceed to the second step to determine whether the action at the 
heart of a plaintiff’s complaint is one that is traditionally guided by 
state law. In this second step, courts should be especially cognizant 
that the core violation is some form of misrepresentation, as opposed 
to a violation that flows from the defendant’s behavior, the 
wrongfulness of which is not solely dependent on disclosure. 
A. Courts Should Ask if the Suit Is of the Type Congress Was 
Attempting To Avoid 
In developing an approach to interpreting SLUSA’s preemptive 
reach, it is essential to understand what exactly Congress was 
attempting to preempt. As discussed previously, the three primary 
concerns that motivated the passage of the PSLRA were strike suits, 
discovery abuse, and a chilling of forward-looking statements.219 
Similarly, SLUSA was enacted to plug a very specific hole in the 
PLRSA: the unintended migration of plaintiffs to state court to avoid 
the procedural hurdles of the PSLRA.220 Preemption should be 
construed broadly enough to achieve these goals, but no further. 
1. Congress Was Focused Only on Certain Types of Fraud Suits.  
When interpreting the reach of SLUSA, it is informative to examine 
the types of claims brought in state courts between 1995 and 1998 that 
were not previously brought in state court before the PSLRA. 
Presumably, these are the only types of claims that should be 
preempted. The legislative history belies any suggestion that 
Congress intended to foreclose shareholder suits alleging, for 
example, that negligent investment advisors were retained to advise 
on an acquisition, or that officers failed to disclose material 
information related to proxy statements.221 
Before the PSLRA was enacted in 1995, the most common cases 
brought in state court were “corporate law claims alleging breaches of 
 
 219. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.  
 220. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra Part II.A.1.  
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fiduciary duty in connection with mergers or other corporate 
transactions, which have traditionally been filed in state court.”222 
When the increase in state filings began post-1995, the new types of 
actions brought included “financial misrepresentation cases” and 
“false forecast” cases223—exactly the type of actions that would be 
subject to the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements and would 
threaten the effectiveness of the safe harbor for forward-looking 
statements. Furthermore, many actions were filed concurrently in 
state and federal court. These were clear attempts to evade the 
impact of the discovery stay and created the very lack of uniformity 
that Congress had sought to eliminate.224 The evidence underlying 
these alleged trends, however, was disputed.225 But it was undisputed 
that any change in federal regulation of securities-fraud litigation 
should not impact traditional state regulation of corporations.226 The 
current case law shows that SLUSA has led to a substantial federal 
incursion into an area traditionally handled by state courts applying 
state law.227 
Accordingly, courts should not hesitate to dismiss these suits 
targeted by the PSLRA, but they should hesitate to dismiss cases that 
historically would have been brought in state court before the 
PSLRA and SLUSA, as Congress intended the Delaware carve-out to 
exclude them. Though this determination will not always be clear, it is 
impossible to ignore this mandate where Congress has explicitly 
spoken about the specific ill it was attempting to remedy. 
Of course, the Supreme Court in Dabit declared in no uncertain 
terms that SLUSA should be interpreted broadly,228 but that does not 
doom this approach. In fact, this approach is more in line with Dabit 
than those approaches taken by some of the lower courts. First, the 
 
 222. Perino, supra note 26, at 308.  
 223. See id. at 312–13 (noting the distinctions in how claims were pled in the pre- and post-
PSLRA periods).  
 224. See id. at 303 (describing conclusions of the Grundfest-Perino study presented to 
Congress during hearings on SLUSA). For mention of the Grundfest-Perino study, see supra 
note 29. 
 225. See supra note 31.  
 226. See The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260 Before 
the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 69, 71 
(1998) (statement of John F. Olson, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher) (“Everyone agrees that 
Federal legislation should not prevent States from making rules for the governance of 
corporations, or from imposing duties on the corporate directors and officers.”).  
 227. For a review of this case law, see supra Part II. 
 228. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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fatal flaw of Dabit’s claim was that the misconduct he complained of 
was identical to that of a typical fraud claim under Section 10(b), even 
though Dabit himself could not have brought a claim under Section 
10(b).229 Congress clearly wished fraud in connection with securities 
transactions to be treated uniformly and believed this would be best 
achieved in federal courts, not state courts. Thus, Dabit likely reaches 
the right result. But it is a strained result to apply this thinking when a 
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, not a failure to disclose, is the 
central component of a plaintiff’s claims. If the Court in Dabit found 
instructive the comparison of the complained-of misconduct to a 
traditional Section 10(b) claim, lower courts should find such a 
comparison similarly helpful, even if the factual circumstances of 
different cases might not lead to the same result. Second, the Court 
also acknowledged the careful efforts of Congress to exempt certain 
types of claims from SLUSA’s reach.230 It would be odd if courts could 
disregard these explicit exemptions in interpreting SLUSA. 
2. Congress Specifically Excluded Those Fiduciary-Duty Suits 
That Were Likely also To Constitute Securities Fraud.  The inclusion 
of the derivative-action exemption and the Delaware carve-out 
indicates congressional awareness of potential overlap between the 
new national standard for securities fraud and areas traditionally 
handled by the states that Congress did not want to disturb.231 In fact, 
Michael Perino, one of two authors of a report to Congress about the 
perceived migration of actions to state court,232 noted in another 
article that his study did not include derivative actions or class actions 
based on breaches of fiduciary duties, as the filing of those suits in 
state court was likely not related to the PSLRA.233 Therefore, the rare 
 
 229. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 89 (2006).  
 230. Id. at 87.  
 231. See O’Hare, supra note 34 at 504 (“The adoption of the Delaware carve-out, therefore, 
ensured that [SLUSA] would not impinge upon Delaware’s need to regulate the conduct of 
corporate directors.”).  
 232. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 29.  
 233. See id. at 303 n.128 (“The second kind of action in which companies can, and have 
traditionally been, sued in state court are class or derivative actions alleging breaches of officers’ 
and directors’ duties of loyalty, care, or candor. These cases are unlikely to be related to 
[SLUSA] [and are therefore not included in the Grundfest-Perino study].”); see also Richard W. 
Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of 
Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 103 (1998) (“Cases filed only in state court should not have been 
counted as state securities cases unless they raised claims equivalent to claims that could have 
been brought in federal court. Otherwise, these state cases more closely resembled fiduciary 
duty claims under state corporate law.”).  
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class-action breach-of-fiduciary-duty suit, such as the one in Brown, 
was not the type of suit that SLUSA was intended to reach. In 
defining the scope of SLUSA, Congress was aware that many state 
actions, primarily those in areas of corporate governance and control, 
had been and would continue to be brought in state court.234 Courts 
should be equally cognizant of the scope of these exemptions and the 
implications they have on the limits on SLUSA’s reach. 
3. The Presumption Against Complete Preemption Is Applicable 
to SLUSA.  Though SLUSA has been termed a statute of preclusion 
rather than one of preemption, courts must still remain cognizant of 
the general presumption against interpreting a statute in a way that 
would foreclose traditional state-law causes of action.235 This 
presumption has been found to be particularly strong when coming to 
such a conclusion would entirely eliminate remedies traditionally 
available under state law.236 
The Supreme Court has pronounced, “SLUSA does not actually 
pre-empt any state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the right 
to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims.”237 However, 
the Court has also recognized elsewhere the importance of the class-
action device generally as a means of vindicating the rights of 
individuals who would not have incentive to otherwise pursue a 
claim.238 It is unreasonable to say that the ability to bring an individual 
claim in state court diminishes the preemptive effect of SLUSA, 
considering that the class-action device may well be the only mode of 
recourse for noninstitutional investors seeking compensation for 
legitimate injuries. 
Furthermore, the general presumption against interpreting a 
statute to preempt entrenched state-law causes of action cannot be 
forgotten when considering the reach of SLUSA.239 When the Court 
held in Dabit that SLUSA extends to cover state-law holder claims, it 
 
 234. See supra Part I.D. 
 235. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (establishing the general 
presumption). 
 236. See Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“If Congress had 
intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would 
have expressed that intent more clearly.”).  
 237. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006).  
 238. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).  
 239. The Court in Medtronic also clarified that the presumption applies not only to the 
broad question of whether there was any preemption, but also narrowly to each question of the 
scope of preemption raised by the statute in question. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
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recognized that although those claims were theoeretically available 
before SLUSA, the respondent in that case was only able to identify 
one time in which such a claim had actually been brought in state 
court.240 Therefore, the Court explained, “[t]his is hardly a situation, 
then, in which a federal statute has eliminated a historically 
entrenched state-law remedy.”241 That same principle should counsel 
the opposite conclusion when considering the preemption of claims 
for breaches of fiduciary duties.242 Claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
are “historically entrenched” state-law claims for which there is no 
federal parallel. Thus, plaintiffs would be completely without a 
remedy if the Seventh Circuit’s approach were to be adopted as the 
prevailing legal test. Additionally, congressional intent is relevant to 
the scope of preemption,243 and the existence of the carve-out is 
important evidence of such intent.244 
B. Courts Should Look to the Heart of a Complaint 
In ascertaining whether a complaint falls within one of these 
problematic categories,245 courts should look to the heart of a 
complaint. Specifically, courts should look to the actions complained 
of rather than the words used to describe those actions.246 Courts 
should be free to look beyond the face of a complaint or the name of 
a claim in determining SLUSA’s reach.247 If a claim could have been 
brought in federal court under Section 10(b), that is the end of the 
inquiry—the claim is preempted. If not, this analysis should not be a 
step-by-step inquiry into whether the plaintiff has a winning Section 
 
 240. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 88.  
 241. Id. (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 449). 
 242. Furthermore, that the Court conducted this analysis in Dabit lends support to the 
proposition that the doctrine is applicable whenever a court is interpreting SLUSA’s reach. That 
it came out the opposite way in one case should not preclude the inquiry in others. See 
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (“That approach is consistent with . . . federalism concerns . . . .”).  
 243. Id.  
 244. See supra Part I.D.  
 245. See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text. 
 246. This is an approach already taken in other instances, such as determining whether a 
multilayered fraud is in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and therefore should 
not be novel or unworkable. See, e.g., Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(looking to the “heart” of the fraud to determine if it was in connection with the purchase or 
sale of covered securities). 
 247. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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10(b) claim,248 but rather should ask whether the crux of what the 
plaintiff is complaining about amounts to securities fraud in 
connection with a transaction that is not covered by the Delaware 
carve-out.249 Accordingly, simply omitting one element of a Section 
10(b) claim, such as scienter, should not allow a plaintiff to avoid 
preclusion. However, some consideration of whether the alleged 
actions, in the aggregate, could have amounted to a violation of 
Section 10(b)—even before the PSLRA—is an approach that may 
best satisfy both congressional intent and federalism concerns. Put 
simply, courts should ask: Is the core violation some form of 
misrepresentation, as opposed to a violation that flows from the 
defendant’s behavior, the wrongfulness of which is not solely 
dependent on disclosure? 
If the alleged misconduct never could have amounted to a 
violation of Section 10(b) before the PSLRA, but could have given 
rise (and, more importantly, often did give rise) to a distinct state-law 
claim before SLUSA, preemption should not occur. As an example, 
in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,250 a case that involved several breaches 
of fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were in 
the wrong court—they were in federal court when they should have 
been in state court.251 Under the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Brown, 
a plaintiff who filed a similar claim in state court could now 
presumably be removed and dismissed under SLUSA, despite the 
Court’s clear statement in Santa Fe that such claims belonged in state 
court. Similarly, should one assume that a class action such as that 
brought in the seminal Delaware decision Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc252—which was based on several breaches of fiduciary duty but 
included a failure to disclose the walk-away price of a bidder253—
would now be removed to federal court under the Brown approach? 
 
 248. Cf. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[SLUSA] covers 
both good and bad securities claims—especially bad ones.”), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 
633 (2006). 
 249. Cf. Feitelberg v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002), 
aff’d, 353 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In other words, if it looks like a securities fraud claim, 
sounds like a securities fraud claim and acts like a securities fraud claim, it is a securities fraud 
claim, no matter how you dress it up.”).  
 250. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1976). 
 251. See id. at 479–80 (refusing to apply Section 10(b) to claims limited to breach of 
fiduciary duties).  
 252. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 253. Id. at 709.  
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All told, preemption of these claims both contravenes congressional 
intent and affronts states’ authority in this domain. 
C. This Approach Strikes the Appropriate Balance 
The approach advocated by this Note is more nuanced than the 
one advanced by the Sixth Circuit. Under that approach, any hint of a 
misrepresentation will lead to a dismissal.254 In addition, this Note’s 
approach also takes a more global view than that advanced by the 
Seventh Circuit in Brown. As explained above, according to the 
Seventh Circuit almost any actionable breach of a duty of loyalty will 
likely include at least an implicit omission or misrepresentation.255 
These two approaches lead to the dismissal of too many meritorious 
cases in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. The approach recommended 
in this Note gives courts a touchstone for separating those complaints 
that try to evade SLUSA’s reach from those that simply choose not to 
allege securities fraud, without reading the statute to preclude valid 
state-law claims. 
For example, the approach advocated here likely would not have 
changed the result in the two cases from the Sixth Circuit discussed 
above.256 In Segal, the court found that the complaint was full of 
allegations that the fund managers were running a “scheme.”257 This 
Note’s approach would find that the actions complained of are exactly 
the type Congress was trying to avoid. The fund managers allegedly 
knew they were running a scheme when they advertised to investors, 
and they allegedly continued to misrepresent their intentions while 
purchasing and selling covered securities.258 The breach-of-contract 
claim arguably was “a securities fraud wolf dressed up in a breach of 
contract sheep’s clothing.”259 Conversely, in Brown, the improper 
actions were much more like traditional breach-of-fiduciary-duty 
claims than securities-fraud actions. The fund managers made a one-
time decision to “[sell their] child . . . down the river, in breach of 
 
 254. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 255. See supra Part III.A.1.  
 256. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 257. Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Amended 
Class Action Complaint—Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 49–51, Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 
1:07-cv-348, 2008 WL 819290 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2008), 2007 WL 4742074 (providing details of 
the alleged scheme).  
 258. Amended Class Action Complaint—Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 257, ¶¶ 8, 49–
51.  
 259. See supra note 197. 
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[their] fiduciary obligations to the fund’s common shareholders, in 
order to placate banks and brokers.”260 The approach recommended 
in this Note gives courts a touchstone for separating those complaints 
that try to evade SLUSA’s reach and those that fall victim to courts 
that help defendants avoid liability through an overbroad reading of 
the statute. 
Most likely, the state-law cases that truly overlap with SLUSA’s 
scope will fall within one of SLUSA’s two express exemptions, 
leaving only those claims that largely amount to securities fraud and 
those that represent entirely distinct behavior. In cases like Brown, in 
which the misconduct and transactions involved are the essence of 
what the Delaware carve-out seeks to save from SLUSA’s reach, the 
Third Circuit’s approach is a good starting point for analyzing what 
truly is at the heart of a complaint and therefore whether preclusion is 
appropriate.261 The approach advocated here—to consider whether 
the claim at issue is one Congress intended to prevent by focusing on 
the heart of the complained-of transaction—further clarifies, more 
closely than the other lower-court approaches discussed herein, how 
to soften the outcomes reached by the approaches taken in the Sixth 
and Seventh Circuits while still following Dabit’s admonitions. 
CONCLUSION 
SLUSA represents an attempted solution to a very important 
problem. There is little disagreement that the statute “abhor[s] strike 
suits and frivolous litigation of any stripe”262 and was designed to 
minimize the possibility for these abusive actions. However, this does 
not mean that the law should allow for unfair business practices, 
particularly those that the states have made unlawful with fiduciary-
duty laws. The reforms passed in the PSLRA and SLUSA represent 
important efforts to both allow only meritorious lawsuits in the field 
of securities regulation to proceed and to shield directors and officers 
from the distractions and costs of nonmeritorious litigation. They do 
not, and cannot, create an opportunity for defendants to evade 
liability for illegal behavior that is not covered by the statutes, in 
particular for violations of entrenched state laws such as fiduciary 
obligations. 
 
 260. Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 261. See supra Parts II.B.2, III.A.2. 
 262. H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 45 (1998).  
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SLUSA undeniably must be read broadly. However, it was not 
created in a vacuum, and therefore must also be interpreted broadly 
to effectuate its purpose. It is particularly important for courts to focus 
on congressional intent, statutory interpretation principles, and—due 
to the backdrop of dual regulation in the securities industry—
federalism. The presence of the Delaware carve-out offers a unique 
opportunity to determine Congress’s intent through an examination 
of the types of claims that should not be included in SLUSA’s reach. 
Further, because SLUSA was enacted to solve a specific problem 
created by the PSLRA, it is important to look at the types of claims 
that SLUSA targeted—those that migrated from federal to state 
court, not those that remained in state court. This Note has argued 
that looking to the heart of a complaint is the best way to balance a 
broad reading of SLUSA with the important role federalism plays in 
the securities-law context. 
 
